St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 20

Number 3

Article 5

1-1-1989

Squeezing the Lemon - Helping Texas Consumers with New Car
Problems.
Darby Riley

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and
the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Darby Riley, Squeezing the Lemon - Helping Texas Consumers with New Car Problems., 20 ST. MARY'S L.J.
(1989).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol20/iss3/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Riley: Squeezing the Lemon - Helping Texas Consumers with New Car Proble

SQUEEZING THE LEMON-HELPING TEXAS CONSUMERS
WITH NEW CAR PROBLEMS
DARBY RILEY*

I. Introduction ............................................ 617
II. The Lemon Law - An Administrative Remedy .......... 618
III. DTPA - The Potent Weapon ........................... 621
A. U.C.C. Revocation of Acceptance under the DTPA
...................................................
62 1
1. Prelim inaries ................................... 621
2. Elements of Proof - Revocation and the DTPA. 622
3. Problems for the Plaintiff ....................... 625
B. Breaches of Warranties Actionable Under the
D TPA ............................................. 626
1. Implied Warranty of Merchantability ........... 626
2. Breach of the Implied Warranty of
W orkmanship .................................. 629
3. Breach of the Express Warranty to Repair
Defective Automobile .......................... 629
4. Other Warranties .............................. 631
C. Other DTPA Claims ............................... 631
1. Unconscionability .............................. 631
2. Laundry List Violations ........................ 632
3. Damages Recoverable .......................... 632
IV. Conclusion ............................................. 634
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Texans cannot get help with legal problems involving their
new automobiles. One reason is that many attorneys in general practice do not feel confident in this area of the law. This article is an
* Attorney, San Antonio, Texas; B.A., University of Texas, 1972; J.D., St. Mary's University, 1976; Director, Consumer Law Section, State Bar of Texas, 1981-1987; Board Certified, Civil Trial Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance and advice of Tom Black, Stephen C. Cochran, Dennis K. Drake and Steve
Reznickek.
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attempt to summarize several of the legal avenues now open to Texas
consumers to get relief from the high cost and extreme frustration of a
lemon.' Attorneys will find that this work involves performing the
important social function of encouraging more responsiveness from
automobile manufacturers; it incidentally results in reasonable attorney's fees paid by these solvent defendants.
II. THE LEMON LAW - AN ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY
The Texas Motor Vehicle Commission Code2 (the "Code") was
created in 1971 to, among other things, police the sale and warranty
service of new motor vehicles in Texas. In 1983, the Code was
amended to add the "Lemon Law," 3 providing an administrative remedy which can be successfully pursued by a lemonized new vehicle
owner with or without a lawyer. However, there are numerous hurdles for the owner to clear before obtaining relief under the law, and
the relief itself is somewhat limited.
The entire Texas "lemon law" occupies only two pages in the statute books. Its procedure for obtaining statutory cancellation of the
transaction is summarized in a "Notice to New Motor Vehicle Buyers," the substance of which must be posted at all dealerships and
provided to all new car buyers by the dealer.4 (Appendix A).
To make a case before the hearing examiner, a consumer must
prove that the manufacturer or distributor has been unable to correct
any defect which substantially impairs the use and market value of
the motor vehicle after "a reasonable number of attempts." 5 If the
vehicle has been in the repair shop for the same warranty repairs four
times, or for a total of thirty or more days, during the shorter of the
1. The term "lemon," according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is American slang
apparently deriving from gambling machines which denoted the lemon as the indicator for
"you lose"; it appeared as early as 1931 as a name used in the trade for second-hand cars of
little value.
2. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) (Vernon Supp. 1988).

3. Id. § 6.07. As of 1985, at least 29 states had similar statutes, known uniformly as
lemon laws. See Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty

Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1405, 1411 n.26. Several of such statutes provide for more extensive
relief than does the Texas law. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-179 (West Supp.

1988)(covering leased vehicles and providing for refund of finance charges and incidental damages as well as purchase price); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.10-1.08 (West Supp. 1988) (amended
effective Jan. 1989 to establish extensive state-run arbitration program).
4. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 4.07 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
5. Id. § 6.07(c).
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warranty term or the first year after purchase, section 6.07(d) of the
statute raises a presumption that there have been a reasonable number
of attempts.6
Although it looks simple, significant drawbacks exist to this administrative remedy. For example, the maximum relief recoverable is a
refund of the purchase price minus an allowance for use.7 A deduction for mileage will be figured on the basis of a 100,000 mile useful
life of the car. A per-mile value is calculated by dividing the purchase
price by 100,000. The examiner will deduct the full value for troublefree miles and half value after the defect is complained of. Thus, if the
vehicle has 20,000 miles at the time of the hearing, at least 10% of the
purchase price will be deducted from the award.' The Code provides
for an alternative remedy of replacement of the lemon with a "comparable motor vehicle," 9 but the Commission has so far found this approach unworkable. 10
Under the lemon law remedy, a consumer cannot obtain attorney's
fees or finance charges paid, or any incidental, consequential or additional damages. Moreover, a consumer must keep and continue to
pay for the problem vehicle until the hearing before the Commission
in order to allow for inspection by the hearing examiner. The Commission has been hindered by a significant backlog of cases in the last
few years, so that a delay of two years from complaint to hearing has
been common. However, the legislature recently doubled the Commission's staff (from ten to twenty employees) and it is expected that
the average delay will soon be reduced to under one year.
Attorneys representing the manufacturers and appearing before the
Commission are now highly experienced and skilled in defending the
lemon claim. A consumer will lose his case if: (1) he fails to submit
his complaint to the Commission within six months following the earlier of the expiration of the express warranty (often 12,000 miles) or

6. Id. § 6.07(d).
7. Id. § 6.07(c).
8. Tex. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 107.8 (Hart Nov. 1,
1986)(Lemon Law Rules), amended eff. Sept. 15, 1988.
9. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
10. See id.; see also Interview with Henri Ten Brink, Assistant Director of Enforcement,
Tex. Motor Vehicle Comm'n (Sept. 1988). Reasons for this inability are that "comparable"
supposedly does not mean new and a replacement vehicle with several thousand miles on it
might pose additional problems. Other assistance on this portion of this article was given by
Ruth Casarez, Assistant Director of Consumer Affairs, Texas Motor Vehicle Commission.
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one year after delivery of the motor vehicle;'" (2) the defect is the
result of abuse, neglect, or unauthorized changes to the vehicle;12 or
(3) the defect does not substantially impair the value or use of the
vehicle.' 3 Additionally, if only dealers have been notified, it may be
necessary that notice be sent directly to the manufacturer and an additional opportunity to cure given before the presumption in section
6.07(d) is applicable.' 4
The lemon law remedy can be pursued simultaneously with other
remedies'5 and may assist a consumer in getting the fastest possible
resolution of his problem. Additionally, it may complement the
DTPA suit. If a consumer exhausts the administrative remedy before
the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission, the lemon law expressly provides that he is entitled to use section 6.07 as the basis of a DTPA
action.' 6 Thus, if a consumer prevails before the Motor Vehicle Commission, and the manufacturer or distributor appeals for "trial de
novo" in the district court, the consumer should be able to recover
under the DTPA by satisfying the "four attempts or thirty days" presumption and obtaining a finding that the defect or condition substantially impairs the use and market value of the motor vehicle." The
lemon law is a cancellation remedy which appears simpler than revocation of acceptance under the Uniform Commercial Code. With no
reported cases, significant questions exist as to how (or whether) this
post-administrative remedy will work in practice.' 8

11. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(h) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
12. Id. § 6.07(c).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 6.07(d). Section 6.07(d) provides in part: "In no event shall the presumption
herein provided apply against a manufacturer or distributor unless the manufacturer or distributor has received prior direct notification in writing from or on behalf of the owner and had an
opportunity to cure the alleged defect." Id.
15. Id. § 6.07(f).
16. Id. § 6.07(e).
17. Id. Section 6.07(e) provides in part: "The provisions of this section [Sec. 6.07, the
Lemon Law] are available in an action against a manufacturer or distributor brought under
Chapter 17, Business and Commerce Code, after the owner has exhausted the administrative
provisions provided by this section. Any action brought under the provisions of this section
shall be by trial de novo." Id.
18. For example, if the consumer prevails before the Commission and there is no appeal,
is there still the right to continue suit in district court for other damages and attorney's fees
under the DTPA? See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.07(f) (Vernon Supp.
1988). The phrase, "[t]his action does not limit the rights or remedies available to an owner
under any other law," would seem to permit such DTPA action. Id.
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III.

A.

DTPA - THE POTENT WEAPON

UC.C. Revocation of Acceptance under the DTPA
1. Preliminaries

A logical and easy-to-prove remedy for a Texas consumer who has
purchased a lemon is revocation of acceptance in accordance with section 2.608 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. 9
The typical case involves a new vehicle that has been returned to
the dealer several times for the same defect(s). Because the defect
remains uncorrected, the dealer points to the manufacturer, whose
representative may be polite but equally ineffective in solving the
problem. Additionally, the defect is one which substantially impairs
the value of the vehicle to the consumer. The consumer then finds an

attorney and asks him to cancel the deal, get (at least) the consumer's
money back, relieve the consumer of his or her obligation to pay for
the vehicle, and recover attorney's fees.
Plaintiff's attorney, after securing an employment agreement,20
sends a notice letter which complies with both section 2.60821 and
section 17.50522 of Texas Business and Commerce Code.2 3 Often the
19. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968) provides as
follows:
(a) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(1)
(2)

on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it has
not been seasonably cured; or
without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.

(b) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in
condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until
the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(c) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
20. Such an employment agreement might typically include a small retainer, plus a percentage of a total recovery, or attorney's fees awarded and collected, whichever is greater, plus
costs and expenses.
21. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608(b) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968Xnotice must be
given to seller of any defect forming basis for revocation).
22. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505 (Vernon 1987)(consumer must give at least
30 days notice prior to filing suit).
23. The notice should be by certified mail, return receipt requested, and should probably
be sent to the dealer, the manufacturer, and the financer (unless the financer is unrelated to the
dealer or manufacturer). It should include a statement of the defects or conditions which
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dealer will not respond to this letter because it is not responsible for
the manufacturer's warranty problems; and the manufacturer will not
respond because to do so might set a bad precedent. After thirty days
have elapsed from receipt of the notice by all potential defendants,
including the dealer, manufacturer, and financer (unless financed independently by the consumer), it is time to file suit against all24 such
parties.2 5

2.

Elements of Proof-

Revocation and the DTPA

Plaintiff must allege, prove, and obtain findings that the automobile

has a "non-conformity" or defect which substantially impairs its
value to him; and that the defect or defects have not been "seasonably
cured," i.e., cured within a reasonable time.2 6 The consumer must

remain uncorrected after a specified number of repair attempts; and that the consumer is revoking acceptance. It should also state that suit is contemplated under the DTPA for breach
of warranty, unconscionable action or course of action and any other applicable provision of
the DTPA, stating additional facts if necessary for clarity. It must include "the amount of
actual damages and expenses, including attorney's fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the
consumer in asserting the claim against the defendant." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.505 (Vernon 1987). The damages and attorney's fees claimed should be supportable by
evidence, keeping in mind that a jury may see the letter. Additionally, if the vehicle is being
returned as part of revocation of acceptance, the financer should be cautioned not to adversely
affect the consumer's credit rating, at the risk of giving rise to an additional cause of action.
24. It is probably not critical to include the dealer in a revocation of acceptance suit, since
it is well established that a manufacturer can be responsible, without regard to privity, for the
economic loss which results from its breach of the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranties. Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977)(privity not
required for liability under section 2.608 of UCC). The remote manufacturer is a "seller"
within that definition under the UCC. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.103(4) (Tex.
UCC)(Vernon 1968).
25. The petition may contain alternative actions, all under the DTPA, for breach of warranty, unconscionable actions, and violation of any express warranties or violation of the
"laundry list." See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(1), (2), (3) (Vernon 1987). It
should allege compliance with the notice prerequisite of section 17.505. Id. § 17.505. It
should state that the violative conduct was the producing cause of actual damages and state
the types of damages claimed. Id. § 17.50. If the facts allow, the conduct should be alleged to
have been committed "knowingly," and claim made for the penalties and attorney's fees allowed by the DTPA. Id. § 17.50(b)(1). Prejudgment interest on the damages in accordance
with Texas law should also be claimed. If the administrative remedy before the Motor Vehicle
Commission has been exhausted, a claim may also be asserted for cancellation under that
statute and the DTPA. Finally, the petition should probably state that the limitation of remedies in the manufacturer's written warranty fails of its essential purpose and is inoperative. See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
26. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.204 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968)(seasonably is defined as reasonable time under UCC).
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further show that he notified27 the seller of the revocation within a
reasonable time after he discovered or should have discovered the
ground for revocation, and before the automobile has materially deteriorated except by reason of its own defects.28 These findings alone
may not be sufficient to permit recovery under the DTPA,29 although
a breach of warranty seems implicit in a revocation claim. To be safe,
the consumer should obtain jury findings which establish a DTPA
violation, either under breach of express or implied warranty, 30 unconscionability, 3' or the laundry list. 32 One way to combine revocation of acceptance findings with DTPA findings is to submit the jury
questions of whether the defendant failed to complete warranty repairs in a good and workmanlike manner and whether such failure
was a producing cause of actual damages. An affirmative finding on
these questions will partially support a judgment for revocation of acceptance as well as one for a DTPA violation. 33 Although the DTPA
expressly authorizes "restoration of consideration" 34 as a proper alternative relief for consumers, two Texas appellate courts have refused to
restore the purchase price to buyers who failed to prove the elements
of revocation of acceptance, but who did show a DTPA violation. 35
On the other hand, restoration of consideration has been consistently allowed as one element of damages where the defendant's conduct violated the DTPA "laundry list" or was unconscionable, if such
conduct was found to be a producing cause of the loss of the purchase
price. 31 Unconscionability, as defined in the DTPA,37 can be seen in
27. Id. § 1.201(26), (27) (notification need not be in writing but best if it is).
28. Id. § 2.608(b) comment 6.
29. See Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 704 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, no writ)(in addition to revocation of acceptance jury allowed DTPA claim based on
alleged laundry list violations not revocation elements).
30. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987).
:1. Id. §§ 17.45(5), 17.50(a)(3).
32. Id. §§ 17.46(b)(l)-(24), 17.50(a)(1).
33. See Breach of the Implied Warranty of Workmanship, Part III.B.2 of this article,
infra notes 71-75.
34. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(3) (Vernon 1987).
35. David McDavid Pontiac, Inc. v. Nix, 681 S.W.2d 831, 836 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)(consumer must offer to return car in order to later have consideration restored); Freeman Oldsmobile-Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(plaintiff must plead and prove revocation of acceptance for
restoration of considerations).
36. See Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985)(plaintiff awarded greatest
amount of damages possible); Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 118
(Tex. 1984)(restoration of consideration possible for DTPA violations); Woo v. Great South-
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many automobile transactions with serious warranty problems and
should be included as an alternative and independent cause of action
in plaintiff's pleadings.
Important questions to consider at this point: Should the consumer
continue to drive the car while the suit is pending? Is such use inconsistent with his claim of revocation of acceptance?
In Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis,38 the court upheld jury findings
allowing revocation where the new car buyer gave notice of revocation twenty months after purchase and where the vehicle had 22,000
miles at the time of the notice and 40,000 miles at the time of trial. 9
The court noted that the buyer had a security interest in the rejected
vehicle and had no obligation to return it or tender the value of the
mileage under Uniform Commercial Code requirements.40 Continued
limited use of the vehicle may be the most economical course for a
consumer when the vehicle is financed independently of the dealer or
has been purchased outright, but a risk exists that a jury will find such
use inconsistent with revocation. 4'
Perhaps a better option for the consumer is to return the car to the
financer or dealer after notice. This lowers the stakes of the litigation
by getting the vehicle sold and crediting the foreclosure price toward
the retail installment contract, without continual depreciation of the
vehicle while the litigation is pending (the revocation suit often involves a counterclaim for the unpaid balance by the financer). Before
returning the car, care should be taken to allow all parties a thorough
inspection of the vehicle for purposes of expert testimony before returning the car.
A related question which arises during a revocation of acceptance
western Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)(plaintiff may recover greatest damages possible).
37. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987)(unconscionability defined
as act which takes advantage of lack of knowledge or results in gross disparity in value received and consideration paid).
38. 704 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985), rev'd in part on other grounds,
709 S.W.2d 176 (Tex 1986).
39. Id. at 367.
40. Id. at 369-70 (section 2.71 l(c) of UCC provides buyer who revokes acceptance with
security interest in goods and court based findings of buyer's rights on section). In fact, the
plaintiff voluntarily credited her claim for reimbursement with 20 cents per mile. Id. The jury
found $4400 as the sum of money "which would reasonably and fairly compensate defendant
for the plaintiff's use and benefit of the automobile." Id.
41. See Lutz, Section 2.608, Revocation of Acceptance of Non-Conforming Goods: The
Seller's Defenses, 13 1T.C.C. L.J. 348, 349 (1981).
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suit is whether the consumer should continue to make payments to
the financer42 after sending notice of revocation. Ideally, to do so is
best because it eliminates the risk of a successful counterclaim by the
financer if the consumer loses.4 3 However, a consumer often cannot
afford to pay for a non-functioning vehicle, particularly if he must
"cover" with a replacement vehicle. A consumer should decide
whether to proceed without making payments based on an assessment
of the risks of losing the case and consequent liability on the retail
installment contract held by the financer.
A return of the automobile to the financer may result in an adverse
credit rating for the consumer, reflecting default, repossession, and a
deficiency balance. This problem can perhaps best be forestalled in
the initial notice letter in which the financer can be informed of a
probable additional claim under the Texas Debt Collection Practices
Act" if the consumer's rating is damaged unjustifiably.4" Compensation for unjustified damages to credit rating can be a substantial addition to the consumer's recovery.46
3. Problems for the Plaintiff
There are several technical defenses which can be raised to the action for revocation of acceptance. If the jury fails to find that the
notice of revocation was timely or finds that the consumer has continued to exact beneficial use from the vehicle where cover was available,
the court may find that the remedy has been waived or barred."
42. Again, "financer" here means one connected to the dealer or manufacturer and not to
the consumer. A financer under such circumstances is subject to all claims and defenses which
the consumer has against the dealer or manufacturer up to the amount paid on the contract.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1976)(FTC Holder-in-Due-Course Rule). If the consumer financed the
vehicle independently, he will, of course, have to make the payments.
43. See Neily v. Arron, 724 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no
writXmobile home buyer denied revocation of acceptance and finance company was granted
judicial foreclosure against buyer on retail installment contract).
44. TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-11.01 (Vernon 1987).
45. Id. Article 5069-11.05(g) prohibits "misrepresenting the character, extent, or amount
of a debt against a consumer." Where a debtor justifiably revokes acceptance, an adverse
report to a reporting agency would seem to be such a misrepresentation. The statute provides
for actual damages and attorney's fees. A common law action for defamation of credit reputation may also be available.
46. See Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 709 S.W.2d 785, 795 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ)(truck purchaser awarded $50,000 for loss of credit resulting from defendant's repossession).
47. For an excellent national survey of the ins and outs of revocation of acceptance, see

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:617

Other facts which may bar revocation are damage to the vehicle not
related to the defects or failure to prove that the defects substantially
impaired the value of the vehicle to the consumer.48
B. Breaches of Warranties Actionable Under the DTPA
1. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
An important alternative remedy to revocation of acceptance in the
typical lemon case is the claim of breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability under section 2.314 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code.49 This cause of action addresses the basic problem of an
automobile which is substandard and/or unfit for the ordinary purpose for which such vehicle is used." Generally, under federal law,
this warranty cannot be disclaimed in the sale of a new car." The
facts giving rise to the claim under the merchantability warranty are
often the same as those under revocation of acceptance: The consumer keeps taking the car back for repairs and the manufacturer,
Lutz, Section 2.608, Revocation of Acceptance of Non-Conforming Goods: The Seller's Defenses, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 348 (1981).
48. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.608 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
49. Id. § 2.314. Section 2.314 provides as follows:
(a) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(b) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(2) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(5) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(6) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any.
(c) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316) other implied warranties may arise from
course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id.
50. Id.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976)(provides that seller cannot disclaim implied warranties if written warranty is provided in consumer transaction); see also Gates v. Chrysler Corp.,
397 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). It is curious that a disclaimer was upheld
without explanation in Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844,
852 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ). The Magnuson-Moss Act also provides a federal
cause nf action for violation of state warranties, Pand permits consumers to recover actual damages and attorney's fees. See Bixby, Judicial Interpretation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act, 22 AM. Bus. L. J. 125, 128 (1984).
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through his dealer, keeps failing to correct the defects. To establish a
breach, a consumer need only provide a reasonable opportunity to
cure and need not continue to return the vehicle indefinitely. 2
It is often best to include the merchantability claim in a revocation
suit as a fall-back position. If the court or jury fails to find that the
defects substantially impaired the value of the vehicle to the consumer
or that notice of revocation was not timely sent, revocation of acceptance will not be allowed. Yet the implied warranty of merchantability
may still have been breached and actual, incidental, and consequential
damages produced thereby may be awarded, as well as additional
damages under the DTPA. 3
A significant problem in warranty of merchantability suits is proof
of actual damages. The usual measure of actual damages in such
cases is the difference between the market value of the vehicle if it had
been as contracted for and its actual market value at the time and
place of delivery.54 Providing evidence of the actual market value of a
new but defective vehicle is a somewhat speculative effort and one
which witnesses tend to resist.
Thus, in Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray," although both were
asked, neither the plaintiff nor his expert witness testified to a market
value of the defective vehicle at the time of the sale; rather each testified that the vehicle would have had no value to him if the defects had
been disclosed.5 6 The court of appeals found no evidence to support
the jury's substantial award as to the difference in market value. 57 An
identical problem was found in Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis.58
On the other hand, Mercedes Benz of North America v. Dickenson,59
illustrates how simple proof of actual damages can be if the witnesses
understand the question." In Dickenson, the vehicle owner was held
52. See Chrysler Corp. v. Roberson, 619 S.W.2d 451, 460-61 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, no
writ); Sam Montgomery Oldsmobile Co. v. Johnson, 624 S.W.2d 237, 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
53. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2)(Vernon 1987).
54. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.714(b) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
55. 730 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
56. Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 802-03 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ).
57. Id. at 803.
58. See Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 704 S.W.2d 363, 371 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1985, no writ).
59. 720 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
60. Id. at 848-50.
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competent to testify that the difference in market value between what
he paid for and what he got was, in light of the defects of the vehicle,
$8,500.61

The court of appeals had no trouble honoring the time-

tested rule that an owner of property can testify to its market value.62
The competency of an owner to testify as to difference in market
value is important because finding a qualified expert is not easy. Persons actively engaged in the car sales business may be very hesitant to
get involved in such a suit. Virtually no one has experience in selling
new cars with known substantial defects. The manufacturer's attorney can be counted on to energetically challenge the qualifications of
the witness.63 If the consumer prevails on this claim, he can probably
recover, in addition to the difference in value, incidental and conse6
quential damages, as well as other damages under the DTPA.
61. Id. at 850.
62. Id. The court cited the recent cases of Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex.
1984) and Vista Chevrolet, 704 S.W.2d at 371-372. See also Chrysler-Plymouth City, Inc. v.
Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ). In Mercedes Benz of
North America v. Dickenson, the exact testimony of the owner was set out:
On the question of damages Dickenson, as owner, was asked by his attorney:
Q. [MR. MILLER:] If you had known the problems that the car had on April of
1982 when you bought it, do you have an opinion as to what its reasonable market value
would have been that date with those defects?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I have an opinion.
Q. (By Mr. Miller) What, in your opinion, would have been the reasonable market
value in Tarrant County, Texas of that vehicle with those defects?
A.

(By the Witness) Approximately $8,500 less than what I paid for it.

A.

$30,429 on the street.

Q. And you paid what for it?

Q. So that amount, less $8,500 would be your opinion of its market value in a defective condition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the defects being those that you have testified to in this case?
A. Yes, sir. [Emphasis added.]
Dickensen, 720 S.W.2d at 850.
63. See Chrysler Corp. v. Roberson, 619 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, no
writ). The court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's allowance of the testimony of a witness who "had been involved in the sales, repairs and servicing of new and used cars at various
dealerships for 30 to 35 years" and who was engaged in the business of reconditioning and
selling automobiles. Id.; see also Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 802
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ)(insurance company appraiser probably qualified to testify
on question of difference in market value).
64. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968)(consequential and
incidental damages recoverable under code); see also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50(b) (Vernon 1987)(damage provision of DTPA).
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Breach of the Implied Warranty of Workmanship

Texas now clearly recognizes the "implied warranty that repair or
modification services of existing tangible goods or property will be
performed in a good and workmanlike manner."6' 5 "Good and workmanlike means that quality of work performed by one who has the
knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally
considered proficient by those capable of judging such work.""
Expert testimony is not necessary to establish breach of this warranty if the failure to properly repair is within the common knowledge
of laymen.6 7 This implied warranty cannot be disclaimed or waived
and no limitation of remedy for its breach will apply.6" A breach
committed "knowingly" will trigger the right to additional damages,
including mental anguish, allowed under the DTPA.6 9
Thus, if a court finds that the dealer or the manufacturer has failed
to repair the automobile in a good and workmanlike manner, which
conduct was the producing cause of actual damages to the consumer,
the only remaining question will be, how much damage? This newly
defined cause of action may prove to be the best Texas remedy for the
lemon.
3.

Breach of the Express Warranty to Repair Defective
Automobile

The written warranty provided with new automobiles generally
states that the manufacturer agrees to repair any defect in materials or
workmanship and that the, performance of repairs is the exclusive
remedy under the written warranty or any implied warranty. The
problem with this warranty is that the limited remedy of repair, while
valid on its face, is not satisfactory if the consumer has had the same
ineffective repairs numerous times.70 This limited remedy allowed by
the manufacturer fails of its essential purpose when effective repairs
are not performed after reasonable opportunity to do so is given. 7 If
65. Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 355.
68. Id.
69. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon 1987); see also Luna v. North
Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. 1984).
70. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
71. Id.; see also Mercedes Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 856 (Tex.
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the court finds that the remedy has failed of its essential purpose, the
Texas Uniform Commercial Code provides that the other remedies
allowed by the U.C.C. for breach of warranty, including all damages,
are available to the consumer.72 If the limitation of remedies is found
unconscionable under the U.C.C., it will be invalidated by the court. a
The limitation of remedies clause may also be invalid because of the
DTPA provision which makes unenforceable any waiver by a consumer of the DTPA's provisions.74
Although Texas courts have twice rejected similar theories,75 these
cases were not well reasoned.76 In Dickenson, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals upheld an implicit jury finding that the limited remedy
had failed of its essential purpose.77 The court stated:
From the buyer's standpoint, the purpose of the limited remedy is to
give the buyer goods that conform to the contract within a reasonable
time after the defect is discovered .... [T]he limited remedy fails of its
essential purpose and deprives the buyer of the substantial value of the
bargain when the warrantor does not correct the defect within a reasonable time.78
Since breach of warranty is actionable under the DTPA, 79 an alternative DTPA cause of action is available for the new car buyer. The
plaintiff must allege, prove, and obtain findings that the manufacturer
has breached its express warranty to correct the defects, that the conduct was the producing cause of damages, and that the limited remApp.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ)(warranty fails in essential purpose if repairs not made

within reasonable time).
72. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(b) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
73. Id. § 2.719(c).
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987).
75. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ); Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, Inc., 478 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. See Note, Failureof the Essential Purpose of a Limited Repair Remedy Under Section
2.719 of the U.C.C., 32 BAYLOR L. REV. 292, 293-95 (1980); Note, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE- A Limited Remedy Fails of its Essential Purpose Only in the Case of a Negligent
or Willful Repudiation of the Remedy, 51 TEX. L. REV. 383, 386 (1973). See generally Peterson, Seller's Breach of Warranty to Repair or Replace Defective Goods, 83 CoM. L.J. 543

(1978).

77. Mercedes Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 854 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ).
78. Id.
79. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (Vernon 1987)(DTPA cause of action
for breach of express and implied warranties).
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edy of repairs is invalid under either section 2.719 or section 17.42 of
the DTPA. 80
4.

Other Warranties

Less commonly breached warranties in new car transactions are the
82
implied warranties of title" and fitness for a particular purpose.
Oral express warranties may be successfully disclaimed in the new car
contract. 83 However, there is no dearth of cases involving these 84warranties as actionable under the DTPA in used car transactions.
C.

Other DTPA Claims
1. Unconscionability

Several reported Texas cases include findings that the buyer of a
new vehicle was the victim of an "unconscionable action or course of
action" as defined by the DTPA.85 Evidence of conduct found to sup80. The question of whether the limited remedy has failed of its essential purpose has
been held to be a question for the trier of fact which should be pleaded and proved by the party
seeking to invalidate the limitation. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, no writ); see also Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 673 (5th
Cir. 1971). But see Mercedes Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 854 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
81. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.312(a) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968).
82. Id. § 2.315.
83. The Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), permits disclaimer of these
warranties. However, in Mercedes Benz of North America v. Dickenson, the court held such
disclaimer language inoperative under U.C.C. principles. Mercedes Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 852 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
84. See, e.g., Horta v. Tennison, 671 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ)(DTPA provides remedy for breach of warranty of title); Saenz Motors v. Big H
Auto Auction, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 521, 523-25 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983)(breach of warranty of title actionable under DTPA), aff'd, 665 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1984); see also ChryslerPlymouth City v. Guerrero, 620 S.W.2d 700, 704-05 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ);
Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no
writ). Both of these cases involve false statements by used car salesmen to the effect that the
vehicle was in excellent condition, and both of which held such statements to be express warranties which were breached in violation of the DTPA.
85. See Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 802 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1987, no writ); Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1984); see
also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(5) (Vernon 1987). Section 17.45(5) provides:
"Unconscionable action or course of action" means an act or practice which, to a person's

detriment: (A) takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity
of a person to a grossly unfair degree; or (B) results in a gross disparity between the value
received and consideration paid, in a transaction involving transfer of consideration.
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port a finding of unconscionable action includes the refusal to rescind
the purchase after repeated unsuccessful attempts to repair substantial
defects8 6; the failure to perform any repair work at all on repeated
visits for warranty service 7 ; the failure to refund the purchase price in
accordance with a money-back guarantee88 ; the failure to communicate known common problems with the type of new vehicle sold to
8 9 ; the practice of having a customer return repeatedly for
the plaintiff
service rather than acknowledging a problem is irreparable'; and the
failure of the manufacturer to provide proper replacement parts in
connection with the repairs to the car. 9' Unconscionability is thus
another key allegation in a lemon case, one that may avoid the technical pitfalls of the U.C.C. causes of action, and one that permits recovery of the wide range of DTPA damages without limitation.
2.

Laundry List Violations

92
The twenty-three prohibited practices of the DTPA laundry list
do not easily fit the typical new car lemon situation and few cases
have been decided involving such violations. The most commonly
used provision is section 17.46(b)(7) which includes as a deceptive act
representations "that goods or services are of a particular standard,
quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if
they are of another."93 Many breaches of express warranty will also
constitute violations of this section, again without the technical defenses arguable in warranty cases.

3. Damages Recoverable
As discussed, a consumer may recover damages for the purchase
86. Town East Ford Sales, 730 S.W.2d at 807.
87. Id.
88. Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Mercedes Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, no writ).
92. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(1)-(23) (Vernon 1987).
93. Id. § 17.46(b)(7); see also Mercedes Benz, 720 S.W.2d at 847 (defendant violated section 17.46(5) and (7) by making false representations that car of certain grade). A similar
provision, also commonly used, is section 17.46(b)(5), which provides "representing that goods

or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities
which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or
connection which he does not." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(5) (Vernon 1987).
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price if revocation of acceptance is proved,94 or for the "difference in
value" measure of the Uniform Commercial Code for breach of warranty.95 A consumer may probably also recover incidental and consequential damages.96 Other damages recoverable in DTPA actions
include damages for personal injuries97 ; for injury to credit reputation98 ; for loss of time99 ; for lost profits'°°; for finance charges"'1 ; and
for mental anguish if the defendant's conduct, in violation of the
DTPA, was committed "knowingly," or caused physical injury.102 It
should also be noted
that prejudgment interest on actual damages
0 3
recovered.1
be
may
Additionally, the fact finder may award the discretionary DTPA
penalty of up to twice the actual damages if defendant's conduct was
committed knowingly. If defendant's violations were not committed
knowingly, a consumer will still recover the automatic DTPA penalty, 1M which is enhanced in suits involving car dealers and
94. See Vista Chevrolet, Inc. v. Lewis, 704 S.W.2d 363, 369-70 (Tex. App.-1Corpus
Christi 1985, no writ)(court allowed recovery of "deferred payment price," which included
unearned interest, less 20 cents per mile).
95. See text, supra, and accompanying footnotes 53 through 62.
96. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719 (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968). Incidental and
consequential damages are usually excluded by the terms of the written new car warranty, and
it is probably best to obtain an additional finding that the limited remedy of repairs has failed
of its essential purpose in order to open the door to such damages. See id. § 2.719(b). Section
2.719(b) provides in pertinent part: "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this title." Id. The
burden of requiring pleadings and special issues on the failure of the warranty's essential purpose is on the seller, not the buyer. See Mercedes Benz of N. Am. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d
844, 854 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
97. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b)(2) (Tex. UCC)(Vernon 1968); see also
Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 464-65 (Tex. 1980)(personal injury damages recoverable in warranty action).
98. Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 709 S.W.2d 785, 790-91 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(warranty action plaintiff may recover damages for credit injury),
on motion for reh., 711 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986).
99. Village Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Porter, 716 S.W.2d 543, 550 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Superior Trucks, Inc. v. Allen, 664 S.W.2d 136, 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, no writ); Head & Guild Equip. Co. v. Bond, 470 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1971, no writ); see also Metro Ford Truck Sales, 709 S.W.2d at 793.
101. Chrysler Corp. v. Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799, 807 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1981, no writ).
102. See Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. 1984).
103. See Precision Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 671 S.W.2d 924, 930 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1)(Vernon 1987).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

17

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 20 [2022], No. 3, Art. 5

ST. MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20:617

manufacturers.' 05
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Texas consumer saddled with a defective new automobile is no
longer without recourse. There are at least six ways to squeeze compensation out of a lemon, all of which involve the use of the DTPA,
either singly or in combination with other statutes. These remedies
overlap each other to some extent. For example, the finding that a
manufacturer has failed to correct the defects within a reasonable
time after notice supports at least the theories of revocation of acceptance, of breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and
workmanship, of the express warranty to repair defects, and of unconscionability. As these remedies become even more clearly defined by
the courts, manufacturers may find it economical to promptly repair
or replace the problem vehicle, giving the consumer adequate relief
for the sour position in which he was placed.

105. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36), § 6.06(b) (Vernon 1979). This section adjusts the automatic DTPA penalty by the National Consumer Price Index for all motor
vehicle "licensees" as defined by section 6.06(b). Id. As of October, 1988, the automatic penalty in suits against car dealers or manufacturers is twice the first $1,612 of actual damages.
The above calculations are based on Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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APPENDIX A 1°6
NOTICE TO NEW MOTOR VEHICLE BUYERS
THE TEXAS "LEMON LAW" (§ 6.07, Art. 4413(36), R.C.S.), WAS
ENACTED BY THE TEXAS LEGISLATURE TO AID OWNERS
OF NEW MOTOR VEHICLES IN ENFORCING MANUFACTURERS' WARRANTY OBLIGATIONS. OWNERS OF SUCH
VEHICLES MAY BE ENTITLED TO A REFUND OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE OR THE REPLACEMENT OF THEIR VEHICLES IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE MET:
1. THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF REPAIR
BY AN AUTHORIZED DEALER 4 OR MORE TIMES FOR THE
SAME DEFECT, OR HAS BEEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR REPAIR WORK FOR A TOTAL OF 30 DAYS OR MORE DURING
THE FIRST YEAR FOLLOWING ORIGINAL DELIVERY OF
THE VEHICLE OR THE WARRANTY TERM, WHICHEVER IS
EARLIER;
2. THE DEFECT SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRS THE USE
AND MARKET VALUE OF THE VEHICLE;
3. THE MANUFACTURER OR DISTRIBUTOR HAS RECEIVED WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE DEFECT AND HAS
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE THE DEFECT; AND
4. A COMPLAINT IN WRITING HAS BEEN FILED WITH
THE TEXAS MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN ABOVE, NOT LATER THAN 6 MONTHS FOLLOWING EITHER THE EXPIRATION OF THE WARRANTY
TERM OR ONE YEAR AFTER THE ORIGINAL DELIVERY
DATE OF THE VEHICLE, WHICHEVER IS EARLIER.
IF, AFTER A HEARING ON THE COMPLAINT, THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
LEMON LAW ARE SATISFIED, IT MAY ORDER THE MANUFACTURER OR DISTRIBUTOR TO REPLACE THE VEHICLE
OR REFUND ITS PURCHASE PRICE LESS A REASONABLE
ALLOWANCE FOR THE USE OF THE VEHICLE.

106. This notice is provided by the Texas Motor Vehicle Commission, P.O. Box 2293,
Austin, Texas 78768.
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